{"id":17980,"date":"2024-07-30T16:15:53","date_gmt":"2024-07-30T22:15:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.sensorialsunsets.com\/analysis-of-the-icjs-advisory-opinion-on-the-israeli-occupation-and-colonization-in-palestine\/"},"modified":"2024-07-31T11:23:34","modified_gmt":"2024-07-31T17:23:34","slug":"analysis-of-the-icjs-advisory-opinion-on-the-israeli-occupation-and-colonization-in-palestine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.sensorialsunsets.com\/en\/analysis-of-the-icjs-advisory-opinion-on-the-israeli-occupation-and-colonization-in-palestine\/","title":{"rendered":"Analysis Of The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion On The Israeli Occupation And Colonization In Palestine"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Original title: \u201cProlonged occupation and illegal Israeli colonization of the Palestinian territory: analysis of the recent ICJ advisory opinion\u201d. Text written by Professor Nicol\u00e1s Boeglin<\/a>, from the Law School of the University of Costa Rica.<\/em><\/p>\n\n

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<\/p>\n\n

About two weeks ago, on July 12, 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) indicated that it would release its advisory opinion (requested in December 2022 by the United Nations General Assembly) on Friday, July 19, 2024. In this regard, see the official press release issued by the ICJ (in French<\/strong><\/a> and English<\/strong><\/a>) on July 12.<\/p>\n\n

A Small Preliminary Exercise<\/h3>\n\n

We invite our esteemed readers to review the reception of this press release in the major international and national media (either on July 12 or in the following days), in order to verify for themselves whether or not the scant circulation given to this announcement is an objective reality for any observer. Practically no announcement similar to that of the Al Jazeera<\/em> channel on July 12 referring to this press release of the ICJ in The Hague was published in the European or North American press (see announcement<\/strong><\/a> on its X network – formerly Twitter of the same July 12).<\/p>\n\n

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Photo taken from press article<\/em><\/strong><\/a> published in Israel on August 31, 2023 by Magazine+972, entitled \u201c\u2018It’s like 1948\u2019: Israel cleanses vast West Bank region of nearly all Palestinians\u201d<\/em>. Full reading recommended.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n

What could be the reason for such reluctance to reply to an ICJ press release? Probably for the same reasons that explain the omission observed more recently. Regarding a joint letter from former Israeli military and intelligence chiefs dated July 23, addressed to several U.S. congressmen, in anticipation of the July 24 speech by the Prime Minister of Israel in person before the U.S. Congress in Washington (see letter<\/strong><\/a>). Or regarding a lengthy missive from volunteer doctors, surgeons and nurses dated July 25 to top U.S. officials about what they have witnessed in their humanitarian work in Gaza (see letter<\/strong><\/a>).<\/p>\n\n

Israeli occupation<\/h6>\n\n

The network of support close to Israel that always seeks to minimize criticism of Israeli actions in the Palestinian territory in the world of information and communication (to which international news agencies do not escape, as will be seen in other parts of this text) would deserve to be analyzed by experts in communication. An example of a recent New York Times<\/em> (NYT) headline on a new war crime in Gaza omitting to mention Israel (see note<\/strong><\/a> of the July 25 edition) is a clear example of this. (See the same headline with corrections provided that evidence the semantic maneuver of the NYT editorial staff in this link<\/strong><\/a>).<\/p>\n\n

Israeli occupation<\/h6>\n\n

Let’s hope that at some point (given the large number of headlines about what is happening in Gaza in which there is a rarely observed effort from newsrooms and newscasts to minimize the scope of the incessant bombardment of Gaza’s civilian population by Israel for more than 9 months), communication experts will proceed to a detailed analysis of this real disinformation strategy in favor of Israel.<\/p>\n\n

With regard to the United States, the repression against demonstrators on university campuses repudiating Israel’s crimes in Gaza has been such in recent months that United Nations human rights experts have issued a press release from UN headquarters in Europe on July 25 entitled \u201cUSA: Free speech on campus needs to be protected, not attacked, say experts<\/em>\u201d (see full text<\/strong><\/a>). The above exercise in relation to the ICJ press release of July 12 is expected to lead to a similar result with this press release.<\/p>\n\n

Advisory Opinion In Summary<\/h3>\n\n

In its advisory opinion released this July 19 (see full text<\/strong><\/a> in English and full text<\/strong><\/a> in French), the ICJ forcefully concluded (see operative paragraph 285) that Israel’s prolonged occupation since 1967 is illegal and must be immediately suspended.<\/p>\n\n

It should be noted that deliberations among the ICJ judges began on February 27, 2024, with the conclusion of the hearings at Peace Palace<\/em> in The Hague the previous day (see verbatim<\/strong><\/a> of February 26, 2024, with the last oral presentations by the delegations of Spain, Fiji and the Maldives).<\/p>\n\n

In addition, the ICJ stated that all new colonization activity must be suspended and that Israel is under an obligation to make reparation and compensate all natural or moral persons who have suffered the effects of its prolonged occupation and colonization of the Palestinian territory. The ICJ further stated that Israel must evacuate without further ado the Israeli settlers located in the occupied Palestinian territory.<\/p>\n\n

For the ICJ, the other member states of the United Nations have the obligation not to recognize the legal effects of the illegal situation resulting from the illegal occupation of the occupied Palestinian territory, nor to provide any assistance to Israel to maintain it. Point 7 of paragraph 285 (for which 12 judges voted) should already be of concern to many States with which Israel maintains very close relations and whose products exported to Israel are used directly or indirectly to consolidate this illegal occupation and colonization.<\/p>\n\n

Israeli occupation<\/h6>\n\n

The broad consensus among the judges of the ICJ in rendering this advisory opinion is more than evident. Of the 15 full ICJ judges (see current composition<\/strong><\/a>), there was only one dissenting opinion from its Vice-President (a judge from Uganda) (see text<\/strong><\/a>). This is not the first time that this member of the ICJ has diverged from the criteria of her counterparts when it comes to a matter involving Israel (as detailed in this note<\/strong><\/a> from the specialized site Justiceinfo<\/em> of July 23, entitled \u201cWho is Julia Sbutinde, the ICJ judge wha says \u2018no\u2019?<\/em>\u201d).<\/p>\n\n

With regard to the other ICJ judges, it is very likely that Israel’s defiant attitude towards the ICJ judges since they issued a first order on January 26, 2024 (followed by two more), in the contentious case opposing South Africa to Israel, has created a certain indisposition in some of them.<\/p>\n\n

Paragraph 285 Itself<\/h3>\n\n

So that our esteemed readers may judge for themselves the content of the ICJ’s conclusions, we permit us to reproduce the entirety of conclusive paragraph 285 and the 9 operative paragraphs it contains:<\/p>\n\n

THE COURT,\u00a0<\/em>(1) Unanimously,\u00a0<\/em>Finds that it has jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion requested;\u00a0<\/em>(2) By fourteen votes to one,\u00a0<\/em>Decides to comply with the request for an advisory opinion;\u00a0<\/em>(3) By eleven votes to four,\u00a0<\/em>Is of the opinion that the State of Israel\u2019s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful;\u00a0<\/em>(4) By eleven votes to four,\u00a0<\/em>Is of the opinion that the State of Israel is under an obligation to bring to an end its unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as rapidly as possible;\u00a0<\/em>(5) By fourteen votes to one,\u00a0<\/em>Is of the opinion that the State of Israel is under an obligation to cease immediately all new settlement activities, and to evacuate all settlers from the Occupied Palestinian Territory;\u00a0<\/em>(6) By fourteen votes to one,\u00a0<\/em>Is of the opinion that the State of Israel has the obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to all the natural or legal persons concerned in the Occupied Palestinian Territory;\u00a0<\/em>(7) By twelve votes to three,\u00a0<\/em>Is of the opinion that all States are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by the continued presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory;\u00a0<\/em>(8) By twelve votes to three,\u00a0<\/em>Is of the opinion that international organizations, including the United Nations, are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory;\u00a0<\/em>(9) By twelve votes to three,\u00a0<\/em>Is of the opinion that the United Nations, and especially the General Assembly, which requested this opinion, and the Security Council, should consider the precise modalities and further action required to bring to an end as rapidly as possible the unlawful presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.\u00a0<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote><\/figure>\n\n

Israeli occupation<\/h6>\n\n

LA COUR,\u00a0<\/em>1) \u00c0 l\u2019unanimit\u00e9,\u00a0<\/em>Dit qu\u2019elle a comp\u00e9tence pour donner l\u2019avis consultatif demand\u00e9 ;\u00a0<\/em>2) Par quatorze voix contre une,\u00a0<\/em>D\u00e9cide de donner suite \u00e0 la demande d\u2019avis consultatif ;\u00a0<\/em>3) Par onze voix contre quatre,\u00a0<\/em>Est d\u2019avis que la pr\u00e9sence continue de l\u2019\u00c9tat d\u2019Isra\u00ebl dans le Territoire palestinien occup\u00e9 est illicite ;\u00a0<\/em>4) Par onze voix contre quatre,\u00a0<\/em>Est d\u2019avis que l\u2019\u00c9tat d\u2019Isra\u00ebl est dans l\u2019obligation de mettre fin \u00e0 sa pr\u00e9sence illicite dans le Territoire palestinien occup\u00e9 dans les plus brefs d\u00e9lais ;\u00a0<\/em>5) Par quatorze voix contre une,\u00a0<\/em>Est d\u2019avis que l\u2019\u00c9tat d\u2019Isra\u00ebl est dans l\u2019obligation de cesser imm\u00e9diatement toute nouvelle activit\u00e9 de colonisation, et d\u2019\u00e9vacuer tous les colons du Territoire palestinien occup\u00e9 ;\u00a0<\/em>6) Par quatorze voix contre une,\u00a0<\/em>Est d\u2019avis que l\u2019\u00c9tat d\u2019Isra\u00ebl a l\u2019obligation de r\u00e9parer le pr\u00e9judice caus\u00e9 \u00e0 toutes les personnes physiques ou morales concern\u00e9es dans le Territoire palestinien occup\u00e9 ;<\/em>7) Par douze voix contre trois,\u00a0<\/em>Est d\u2019avis que tous les \u00c9tats sont dans l\u2019obligation de ne pas reconna\u00eetre comme licite la situation d\u00e9coulant de la pr\u00e9sence illicite de l\u2019\u00c9tat d\u2019Isra\u00ebl dans le Territoire palestinien occup\u00e9 et de ne pas pr\u00eater aide ou assistance au maintien de la situation cr\u00e9\u00e9e par la pr\u00e9sence continue de l\u2019\u00c9tat d\u2019Isra\u00ebl dans le Territoire palestinien occup\u00e9 ;\u00a0<\/em>8) Par douze voix contre trois,\u00a0<\/em>Est d\u2019avis que les organisations internationales, y compris l\u2019Organisation des Nations Unies, sont dans l\u2019obligation de ne pas reconna\u00eetre comme licite la situation d\u00e9coulant de la pr\u00e9sence illicite de l\u2019\u00c9tat d\u2019Isra\u00ebl dans le Territoire palestinien occup\u00e9 ;<\/em>9) Par douze voix contre trois,\u00a0Est d\u2019avis que l\u2019Organisation des Nations Unies, et en particulier l\u2019Assembl\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, qui a sollicit\u00e9 le pr\u00e9sent avis, et le Conseil de s\u00e9curit\u00e9, doit examiner quelles modalit\u00e9s pr\u00e9cises et mesures suppl\u00e9mentaires sont requises pour mettre fin dans les plus brefs d\u00e9lais \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sence illicite de l\u2019\u00c9tat d\u2019Isra\u00ebl dans le Territoire palestinien occup\u00e9<\/em>.<\/p><\/blockquote><\/figure>\n\n

This paragraph 285 concludes a long reflection by the ICJ on each of these nine points by analyzing the arguments of each party and then contrasting them with the available information as well as with the applicable international norms and international jurisprudence. A methodical and rigorous reflection, which extends over the preceding 284 paragraphs.<\/p>\n\n

Some Points Of Detail<\/h3>\n\n

A full reading of the advisory opinion is recommended in order to observe the reasoning followed by the international judge in The Hague and the extreme care he has taken in analyzing the legal arguments of Israel and some of its allies before the ICJ during the public hearings held in February 2024. As will be seen below, most of these legal arguments were dismissed as legally invalid.<\/p>\n\n

From a temporal point of view, it should be noted at the outset that the ICJ does not include in its reflections the events in Gaza since October 7, clarifying at the beginning of its opinion that the request was made by the General Assembly before that date:<\/p>\n\n

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81<\/em><\/strong>. The Court notes that the request for an advisory opinion was adopted by the General Assembly on 30 December 2022 and asked the Court to address Israel\u2019s \u201congoing\u201d or \u201ccontinuing\u201d policies and practices (see resolution 77\/247, twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth preambular paragraphs, and paragraph 18 (a)). Thus, the Court is of the view that the policies and practices contemplated by the request of the General Assembly do not include conduct by Israel in the Gaza Strip in response to the attack carried out against it by Hamas and other armed groups on 7 October 2023.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

Israeli occupation<\/h6>\n\n

Desde este preciso punto de vista temporal, la lectura de los p\u00e1rrafos 93-94 cobra mayor relevancia, al hacer a un lado la CIJ el argumento defendido por Israel seg\u00fan el cual Israel no ocupa Gaza:<\/p>\n\n

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93<\/em><\/strong>. Based on the information before it, the Court considers that Israel remained capable of exercising, and continued to exercise, certain key elements of authority over the Gaza Strip, including control of the land, sea and air borders, restrictions on movement of people and goods, collection of import and export taxes, and military control over the buffer zone, despite the withdrawal of its military presence in 2005. This is even more so since 7 October 2023.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

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94.<\/strong> In light of the above, the Court is of the view that Israel\u2019s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel\u2019s obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

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93.<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0Au vu des informations dont elle dispose, la Cour consid\u00e8re qu\u2019Isra\u00ebl avait conserv\u00e9 la facult\u00e9 d\u2019exercer, et continuait d\u2019exercer, certaines pr\u00e9rogatives essentielles sur la bande de Gaza, notamment le contr\u00f4le des fronti\u00e8res terrestres, maritimes et a\u00e9riennes, l\u2019imposition de restrictions \u00e0 la circulation des personnes et des marchandises, la perception des taxes \u00e0 l\u2019importation et \u00e0 l\u2019exportation, et le contr\u00f4le militaire sur la zone tampon, et ce, en d\u00e9pit du fait que cet \u00c9tat a mis fin \u00e0 sa pr\u00e9sence militaire en 2005. Cela est encore plus vrai depuis le 7 octobre 2023.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

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94.<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0Compte tenu de ce qui pr\u00e9c\u00e8de, la Cour est d\u2019avis que le retrait d\u2019Isra\u00ebl de la bande de Gaza n\u2019a pas totalement lib\u00e9r\u00e9 cet \u00c9tat des obligations que lui impose le droit de l\u2019occupation. Les obligations d\u2019Isra\u00ebl sont demeur\u00e9es proportionn\u00e9es au degr\u00e9 de son contr\u00f4le effectif sur la bande de Gaza<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

Israeli occupation<\/h6>\n\n

With regard to the natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territory, which Israel controls and diverts for the exclusive use (or almost) of the Israeli colonies established in Palestinian territory, to the detriment of the Palestinian population, we read that:<\/p>\n\n

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133<\/em><\/strong>. On the basis of the evidence before it, the Court considers that Israel\u2019s use of the natural resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is inconsistent with its obligations under international law. By diverting a large share of the natural resources to its own population, including settlers, Israel is in breach of its obligation to act as administrator and usufructuary. In this connection, the Court recalls that the transfer by Israel of its own population to the Occupied Palestinian Territory is contrary to international law (see paragraph 119 above). Therefore, in the Court\u2019s view, the use of natural resources in the occupied territory cannot be justified with reference to the needs of that population. The Court further considers that, by severely restricting the access of the Palestinian population to water that is available in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Israel acts inconsistently with its obligation to ensure the availability of water in sufficient quantity and quality (Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

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133<\/em><\/strong>. Au vu des \u00e9l\u00e9ments de preuve dont elle dispose, la Cour consid\u00e8re que l\u2019usage que fait Isra\u00ebl des ressources naturelles du Territoire palestinien occup\u00e9 n\u2019est pas conforme aux obligations que lui impose le droit international. En d\u00e9tournant une grande part des ressources naturelles au profit de sa propre population, notamment des colons, Isra\u00ebl manque \u00e0 son obligation d\u2019agir en tant qu\u2019administrateur et usufruitier. \u00c0 cet \u00e9gard, la Cour rappelle que le transfert par Isra\u00ebl de sa propre population dans le Territoire palestinien occup\u00e9 est contraire au droit international (voir le paragraphe 119 ci-dessus). Elle estime par cons\u00e9quent que l\u2019utilisation des ressources naturelles du territoire occup\u00e9 ne peut \u00eatre justifi\u00e9e par les besoins de cette population. La Cour consid\u00e8re encore que, en restreignant gravement l\u2019acc\u00e8s de la population palestinienne \u00e0 l\u2019eau disponible dans le Territoire palestinien occup\u00e9, Isra\u00ebl agit de mani\u00e8re contraire \u00e0 l\u2019obligation qu\u2019il a d\u2019assurer un approvisionnement en eau qui soit appropri\u00e9 sur le plan de la quantit\u00e9 autant que de la qualit\u00e9 (article 55 de la quatri\u00e8me convention de Gen\u00e8ve)<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

Israeli occupation<\/h6>\n\n

With regard to prolonged occupation and illegal colonization, accompanied by various practices on the part of Israel to extend its control, the ICJ is particularly blunt in paragraph 179, ruling that they amount to outright annexation:<\/p>\n\n

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179<\/em><\/strong>. The Court has found that Israel\u2019s policies and practices amount to annexation of large parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. It is the view of the Court that to seek to acquire sovereignty over an occupied territory, as shown by the policies and practices adopted by Israel in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, is contrary to the prohibition of the use of force in international relations and its corollary principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

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179.<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0La Cour a conclu que les politiques et pratiques isra\u00e9liennes \u00e9quivalaient \u00e0 l\u2019annexion de vastes parties du Territoire palestinien occup\u00e9. Elle estime que le fait de tenter d\u2019acqu\u00e9rir la souverainet\u00e9 sur un territoire occup\u00e9, ainsi que cela ressort des politiques et pratiques adopt\u00e9es par Isra\u00ebl \u00e0 J\u00e9rusalem-Est et en Cisjordanie, est contraire \u00e0 l\u2019interdiction de l\u2019emploi de la force dans les relations internationales et \u00e0 son corollaire, le principe de non-acquisition de territoire par la force<\/em>. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

Israeli occupation<\/h6>\n\n

In paragraph 229, the ICJ concludes that the existing discrimination regime in Israel violates the provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination<\/em> by stating that:<\/p>\n\n

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229<\/em><\/strong>. La Cour observe que les lois et mesures d\u2019Isra\u00ebl imposent et permettent de maintenir en Cisjordanie et \u00e0 J\u00e9rusalem-Est une s\u00e9paration quasi compl\u00e8te entre les communaut\u00e9s de colons et les communaut\u00e9s palestiniennes. Elle consid\u00e8re, pour cette raison, que les lois et mesures d\u2019Isra\u00ebl emportent violation de l\u2019article 3 de la CIEDR<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

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229<\/em><\/strong>. The Court observes that Israel\u2019s legislation and measures impose and serve to maintain a near-complete separation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem between the settler and Palestinian communities. For this reason, the Court considers that Israel\u2019s legislation and measures constitute a breach of Article 3 of CERD<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

Note that for the South African ICJ judge, this ICJ conclusion implicitly recognizes the apartheid<\/em> regime in force in Israel (see statement<\/strong><\/a>), despite the fact that the term as such is not used by the ICJ. In his individual statement, he reads that:<\/p>\n\n

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41.<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0In the context of all of this, in my view, the Court was correct to find that the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory are in breach of the prohibition of racial segregation and apartheid in Article 3 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, a conclusion that implicitly recognizes the apartheid character of Israeli practices and policies in the OPT<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

Israeli occupation<\/h6>\n\n

As for the legal consequences for Israel, the ICJ applies its now traditional jurisprudence to any international wrongful act of a State duly established and documented and declared as such by the ICJ, ruling emphatically in three paragraphs that are likely to give rise to very diverse initiatives, that:<\/p>\n\n

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268<\/em><\/strong>. The Court further observes that, with respect to the policies and practices of Israel referred to in question (a) which were found to be unlawful, Israel has an obligation to put an end to those unlawful acts. In this respect, Israel must immediately cease all new settlement activity. Israel also has an obligation to repeal all legislation and measures creating or maintaining the unlawful situation, including those which discriminate against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as well as all measures aimed at modifying the demographic composition of any parts of the territory.\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

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269<\/em><\/strong>. Israel is also under an obligation to provide full reparation for the damage caused by its internationally wrongful acts to all natural or legal persons concerned (see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p. 198, para. 152). The Court recalls that the essential principle is that \u201creparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed\u201d (Factory at Chorz\u00f3w, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47). Reparation includes restitution, compensation and\/or satisfaction<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

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270<\/em><\/strong>. Restitution includes Israel\u2019s obligation to return the land and other immovable property, as well as all assets seized from any natural or legal person since its occupation started in 1967, and all cultural property and assets taken from Palestinians and Palestinian institutions, including archives and documents. It also requires the evacuation of all settlers from existing settlements and the dismantling of the parts of the wall constructed by Israel that are situated in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as well as allowing all Palestinians displaced during the occupation to return to their original place of residence.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

Israeli occupation<\/h6>\n\n
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268<\/em><\/strong>. La Cour observe en outre que, en ce qui concerne ses politiques et pratiques vis\u00e9es dans la question a), qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 jug\u00e9es illicites, Isra\u00ebl est dans l\u2019obligation de mettre un terme \u00e0 ces faits illicites. \u00c0 cet \u00e9gard, il doit imm\u00e9diatement cesser toute nouvelle activit\u00e9 de colonisation. Isra\u00ebl est \u00e9galement tenu d\u2019abroger toutes lois et mesures cr\u00e9ant ou maintenant la situation illicite, y compris celles qui sont discriminatoires \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard du peuple palestinien dans le Territoire palestinien occup\u00e9, ainsi que toutes mesures destin\u00e9es \u00e0 modifier la composition d\u00e9mographique de quelque partie de ce territoire.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

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269<\/em><\/strong>. Isra\u00ebl a \u00e9galement l\u2019obligation de r\u00e9parer int\u00e9gralement les dommages caus\u00e9s par ses faits internationalement illicites \u00e0 toutes les personnes physiques ou morales concern\u00e9es (voir Cons\u00e9quences juridiques de l\u2019\u00e9dification d\u2019un mur dans le territoire palestinien occup\u00e9, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 2004 (I), p. 198, par. 152). La Cour rappelle le principe essentiel selon lequel \u00ab la r\u00e9paration doit, autant que possible, effacer toutes les cons\u00e9quences de l\u2019acte illicite et r\u00e9tablir l\u2019\u00e9tat qui aurait vraisemblablement exist\u00e9 si ledit acte n\u2019avait pas \u00e9t\u00e9 commis \u00bb (Usine de Chorz\u00f3w, fond, arr\u00eat no 13, 1928, C.P.J.I. s\u00e9rie A no 17, p. 47). La r\u00e9paration comprend la restitution, l\u2019indemnisation ou la satisfaction<\/em>. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

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270<\/em><\/strong>. La restitution inclut l\u2019obligation pour Isra\u00ebl de restituer les terres et autres biens immobiliers, ainsi que l\u2019ensemble des avoirs confisqu\u00e9s \u00e0 toute personne physique ou morale depuis le d\u00e9but de son occupation en 1967, et tous biens et b\u00e2timents culturels pris aux Palestiniens et \u00e0 leurs institutions, y compris les archives et les documents. Elle exige \u00e9galement que tous les colons des colonies de peuplement existantes soient \u00e9vacu\u00e9s, que les parties du mur construit par Isra\u00ebl qui sont situ\u00e9es dans le Territoire palestinien occup\u00e9 soient d\u00e9mantel\u00e9es, et que tous les Palestiniens d\u00e9plac\u00e9s durant l\u2019occupation puissent retourner dans leur lieu de r\u00e9sidence initial<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

Israeli occupation<\/h6>\n\n

In reality, there are many more legal aspects in which the ICJ clarifies the scope of international law in force in the face of Israel’s actions in the Palestinian territory it occupies.<\/p>\n\n

In turn, the ICJ puts an end to endless debates between States, as well as between, on the one hand, NGOs, academics, specialists in public international law and, on the other hand, \u201cexperts<\/em>\u201d, commentators and analysts sympathetic to Israel and its circles of influence. Incidentally, several of the latter’s \u201carguments<\/em>\u201d can be easily refuted if one takes into account what the UN Security Council had already pointed out in December 2016 in resolution 2334 (see link<\/strong><\/a>). This resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favor and one abstention (United States).<\/p>\n\n

ICJ Consultative Proceedings In Brief<\/h3>\n\n

As is well known, unlike a contentious procedure, the advisory procedure does not conclude with a judgment rendered to resolve a dispute between two States, but with a legal opinion of the international judge of a general nature.<\/p>\n\n

However, in this case, the questions posed by the General Assembly were so formulated as to achieve what is contained in the aforementioned paragraph 285, calling upon Israel to comply with obligations deriving directly from public international law. The comparison between the two general questions put to the ICJ and the detailed manner of answering them indicates that the international judge considered it useful and appropriate to detail his answer in particularly key areas. <\/p>\n\n

It should be recalled that, having received the request in January 2023, the ICJ first asked the 193 Member States of the United Nations and the various United Nations agencies to submit their legal opinions on the questions raised. Fifty-three States decided to submit their opinions, including Israel and Palestine.<\/p>\n\n

Israeli occupation<\/h6>\n\n

In this regard, the 292 pages of the Palestinian brief (see text in French<\/strong><\/a> and in English<\/strong><\/a>) contrast with the modest 5 pages forwarded at the time by Israel. (See text in French<\/strong><\/a> and in English<\/strong><\/a>).<\/p>\n\n

With respect to Israel, it should be noted that, although it could have done so, Israel chose not to participate in the oral hearings. A detail that the U.S. judge at the ICJ found it necessary to point out in her separate statement (see text<\/strong><\/a>), stating that:<\/p>\n\n

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4.<\/strong><\/em>\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>It also is unfortunate that Israel did not meaningfully participate in these advisory proceedings. Israel submitted a five-page written statement to the Court, together with annexes. It chose not to participate in the oral proceedings, despite the fact that up to the opening of those proceedings, the Court had reserved three hours for Israel to present its views \u2014 the same amount of time allocated to the observer State of Palestine, and six times the amount allocated to any other participant. This is an advisory proceeding, and no State was under an obligation to participate, including Israel. Israel\u2019s participation in the oral proceedings, however, would have benefited the Court. Conversely, the failure of a State to participate cannot prevent the Court from fulfilling its responsibilities in replying to an advisory request<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

The fact that Israel considered that the defense of its legal arguments before international justice in The Hague merited no more than the submission of a 5-page brief to the ICJ deserves to be brought to light.<\/p>\n\n

Israeli occupation<\/h6>\n\n

For their part, several Latin American States considered it appropriate to send their legal opinions to the ICJ (Note 1)<\/strong>. The omission of many of the other 193 Member States of the United Nations was not verified in the case of the five permanent Member States of the United Nations Security Council, who sent their legal opinion to the judge in The Hague (Note 2<\/strong>).<\/p>\n\n

We had had the opportunity to analyze the scope of the two questions posed by the United Nations General Assembly in a resolution, which led to two votes at the United Nations, first in November and then in December 2022, in two of our texts to which we refer our esteemed readers:<\/p>\n\n