Original title: “Gaza / Israel: Regarding The Conclusion Of The Hearings In Nicaragua’s Lawsuit Against Germany For Complicity In Genocide In Gaza”. Text written by Professor Nicolás Boeglin, from the Law School of the University of Costa Rica.

On April 9, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced the end of the hearings between Nicaragua and Germany, regarding the urgent request for provisional measures requested by Nicaragua against Germany, accused, among other charges, of complicity in the possible genocide being committed in Gaza by Israeli military forces: the official statement of the ICJ is now available in French and in English.

Nicaragua’s initial complaint was filed on March 1 against Germany (see text in French and English), accompanied by an urgent request for provisional measures.

This application follows the adoption by the ICJ on January 26, 2024 of a first ordinance with respect to Israel, at the request of South Africa (see text of the ordinance in French and in English). A second ordinance was recently adopted on March 28 (see text in French and in English), still at the request of South Africa, in the absence of any change on the part of Israel, in the military actions it has been carrying out in Gaza since the afternoon/evening of October 7, 2023.

It may come as a surprise to the observer that, in support of the lawsuit filed by South Africa against Israel for the unspeakable drama in Gaza, Nicaragua chooses to sue Germany: an interesting report by AlJazeera (in Spanish) recalls the close relationship Nicaragua had with Israel (and in particular with its security advisors and military hardware) for many years before 1979; and, since then, the very close relationship between Nicaragua’s highest authorities and those of Palestine (see report).

Indiscriminate, Disproportionate And Unjustifiable Transfer Of Weapons And Civilian Populations Indiscriminately, Disproportionately And Unjustifiably Bombed

As is well known – but little publicized – Germany is the second largest arms supplier to the Israeli army after the United States. We had the opportunity to analyze this first point in more detail when the ICJ set hearings a few weeks ago (Note 1).

In a recent note EuroNews press release dated March 11 on the global arms trade, it states that:

The US and Germany accounted respectively for 69% and 30% of arms imports by Israel, which is currently fighting a deadly war against Hamas in Gaza which killed over 30,000 people, most of whom were civilians.

In this recent April 4, 2024 BBC report on the exact origin of the materials used by Israel to equip its military forces (see text) it is noted that:

Germany is the next biggest arms exporter to Israel, accounting for 30% of imports between 2019 and 2023, according to SIPRI.

As of early November, the European nation’s weapons sales to Israel last year were worth €300m ($326m; $257m) – a 10-fold increase compared with 2022 – with the majority of those export licences granted after the 7 October attacks.

Components for air defence systems and communications equipment accounted for most of the sales, according to the DPA news agency.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz has been a staunch supporter of Israel’s right to self-defence throughout the war and, although his tone on Israeli actions in Gaza has shifted in recent weeks and there has been some debate in Germany, the arms sales do not appear to be at risk of suspension.

In its complaint against Germany filed more than a month before the publication of this BBC article in The Hague, Nicaragua referred to the same data as the BBC, stating that (paragraph 53):

53. /…/ By the end of 2023, the German Government had granted military exports to Israel in the amount of 326,505,156 euros. On January 2024, German media reported that Israel had made a request for tank shells, especifically 10,000 120-millimeter Rheinmetall precision rounds. Der Spiegel reported that Germany had agreed to deliver the request from its own stocks in order to be able to comply with the “urgency”. According to information made available by the German Government, export licences granted between January 2024 and 15 February 2024 concerned military equipment worth 9,003,676 euros.

It should be noted that the arms trade is a specific area of public international law, with ramifications in domestic law when there is a risk of misuse, and with a legal regime that entails domestic responsibilities of arms exporting States, as was well analyzed in a paper published in 2021 that concludes (page 53):

Legal challenges are gradually becoming a pragmatic response in the face of apparently unlawful decisions by arms exporting states. Governments should recognise this shift and the possibility that their decisions on arms exports will increasingly be subject to legal challenges before domestic courts. Their decisions must be able to withstand judicial oversight and must conform with obligations under both international and domestic law.

(Note 2).

It is noteworthy that last March 6, the pressure has become greater on the US Executive Branch when the Washington Post published a report entitled “U.S. floods arms into Israel despite mounting alarm over war’s conduct” (whose full reading is recommended), in which the total opacity of the US arms transfers to Israel since October 7 is evidenced.

From a legal point of view, it is worth noting that neither Israel nor the United States are States Parties to the Arms Trade Convention adopted in 2013, whose number of States Parties stands at 113 (see official status of signatures and ratifications). Within the United Nations Security Council, of the five permanent members, only the United States and Russia persist in not submitting to the obligations contained in this multilateral treaty.

In relation to the United States and the opacity mentioned above, we must add the limited understanding that the American public has of the reality in Gaza, and the biased way in which the inhuman drama in Gaza is covered in the United States: in this regard, we recommend listening to this recent (and very complete) interview by Democracy Now. A recent disclosure of internal instructions within the New York Times (see article from The Intercept of April 15, 2024) shows how careful some are to avoid using certain terms when writing news stories about what is happening in Gaza.

Finally, in the case of France, a very precise question asked since March 7, 2024 to the French Ministry of Defense by a senator concerning the use given to “ML4” type military components exported to Israel (see question), awaits an answer. As of April 10, it has not yet been answered. An earlier, more general question asked in November 2023 was answered in February 2024. The answer concluded (see link) that:

La France a rappelé le droit d’Israël à se défendre, qui doit s’exercer dans le respect du droit international humanitaire. Le respect des droits de l’homme et du droit international humanitaire par le pays destinataire, de même que les conséquences pour la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité régionales, sont pleinement pris en compte dans le cadre de l’examen des exportations de matériel de guerre par la CIEEMG. Cette stricte grille d’analyse n’a pas conduit à suspendre intégralement le flux d’exportations de matériels de guerre depuis le 7 octobre 2023.

Some decisions taken in recent years on the export of military equipment from Germany and France to the Middle East are worth remembering:

  • in October 2018, Germany suspended its arms exports to Saudi Arabia because of the exactions committed in Yemen by the Saudi-led coalition against Yemeni civilians and the vicious murder of a Saudi journalist in the Saudi Consulate in Turkey (see note from DW);
  • in February 2011, France decided to suspend all arms exports to Egypt in the face of the brutal repression of demonstrators by the Egyptian authorities (see note from Le Monde).

The Folly Of The Israeli Military Commanders In Gaza

Last April 3, 2024, an article published in Israel about “Lavender“, an artificial intelligence program used by the Israeli military since October 7 to carry out so-called “selective” attacks against Gaza, alerted Israeli (and international) opinion about the senseless drift of the Israeli military high command.

The French NGO AURDIP had the generous idea of proceeding to an immediate translation from English into French (see link to the same article translated into French dated April 4), while the German-speaking (and Spanish-speaking) world finds a way to make the contents of this Israeli report known in German (and Spanish). An interview with the person responsible for this investigation conducted by Democracy Now is available (in English) at this link from April 5. This April 15, 2024, a collective communiqué by several United Nations human rights experts denounced the use of programs such as “Lavander” by the Israeli army in Gaza (see communiqué).

So that our esteemed readers may have an idea of the pressure being exerted on Israel and on States that continue to export to Israel arms, munitions and electronic components for military purposes, we permit ourselves to reproduce the voting board of a resolution of the United Nations Human Rights Council (see text) adopted last April 5, 2024.

The resolution had 28 votes in favor, 13 abstentions (including that of Costa Rica…) and 6 votes against (Germany, Argentina, Bulgaria, United States, Malawi and Paraguay). In one of the few notes on Costa Rica’s abstention (see note from the digital media Delfino.cr, titled “UN Human Rights Council calls for arms embargo on Israel; Costa Rica abstained“), it was reported that the Costa Rican delegate in Geneva chose not to proceed with an explanation of his delegation’s vote.

This resolution calls for an arms embargo destined for Israel in item 13 device which reads as follows:

Discover the Nicaragua vs. Germany Gaza case: a crucial debate on human rights and international accountability.

13. Exhorta a todos los Estados a que pongan fin a la venta, transferencia y desviación de armas, municiones y otros equipos militares a Israel, la Potencia ocupante, a fin de evitar nuevas violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario y violaciones y abusos de los derechos humanos, y a que, de conformidad con las normas y los estándares internacionales, se abstengan de exportar, vender o transferir bienes y tecnologías de vigilancia y armas menos letales, incluidos los artículos “de doble uso”, cuando determinen que existen motivos razonables para sospechar que esos bienes, tecnologías o armas podrían utilizarse para violar o conculcar los derechos humanos, y recuerda la providencia de la Corte Internacional de Justicia de 26 de enero de 2024, según la cual existe un riesgo plausible de genocidio en Gaza.

In these early days of April 2024, former members of Israel’s military gathered in the Breaking the Silence organization (see site) have launched a tour in the United States and Canada to denounce to the world the kind of instructions Israeli soldiers receive in Gaza (see interview conducted by Democray Now on April 10, 2024).

Nicaragua’s And Germany’s Respective Final Petitions Coming Soon

As this was an urgent request for provisional measures, the ICJ was limited to hearing a single round of arguments from Nicaragua and Germany.

On April 8, Nicaragua was the first to present its arguments (see verbatim). In the final petition read before the judges, Nicaragua urgently requests the ICJ the following (pages 58-59):

Nicaragua respectfully requests the Court, as a matter of extreme urgency, pending the Court’s determination of this case on the merits, and after recalling to the Parties the obligation of compliance with humanitarian law as well as of the obligation of cooperation to bring to an end all serious breaches of peremptory norms of international law, to indicate the following provisional measures with respect to Germany in its participation in the ongoing plausible genocide and serious breaches of international humanitarian law and other peremptory norms of general international law occurring in the Gaza Strip, as well as in other parts of Palestine, namely, to order that:

(1) Germany must immediately suspend its aid to Israel, in particular its military assistance, export and authorization of export of military equipment and war weapons, in so far as this aid is used or could be used to commit or to facilitate serious violations of the Genocide Convention, international humanitarian law or other peremptory norms of general international law;

(2) Germany must immediately ensure that military equipment, war weapons, and other equipment used for military purposes already delivered by Germany and German entities to Israel are not used to commit or to facilitate serious violations of the Genocide Convention, international humanitarian law or other peremptory norms of general international law;

(3) Germany must resume its support and financing of UNRWA in respect of its operations in Gaza.

With regard to UNRWA, the United Nations agency working with Palestinian refugees, whose funding was withdrawn by Germany after Israeli accusations against a dozen officials were made public on January 26, 2024 (the same day that the ICJ adopted its first injunction against Israel at the request of South Africa…), this recent United Nations report on Israel’s mistreatment of detainees in Gaza (see document) reads that:

They also reported being subjected to threats and coercion while in detention and being pressured during interrogations to make forced confessions against the Agency, including that the Agency has a afiliations with Hamas and that UNRWA stff took part in the 7 October attacks against Israel.

For its part, in its pleadings filed the following day, April 9 (see verbatim), Germany for its part requested in its final pleading the following (page 50) that:

The Federal Republic of Germany asks the Court 

1) to reject the request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by the Republic of Nicaragua; 

and 2) to remove from the General List the case introduced by the Republic of Nicaragua on 1 March 2024.

Our esteemed readers will be able to review in detail the legal arguments of each State, developed in the more than 50 pages of their respective pleadings, which precede their final petitions.

If the reading of both pleadings is tedious, dense and sometimes complex, and the extreme detail of the footnotes sometimes more tedious for the hearing, it should be known that trying to convince 15 ICJ judges of the soundness of their arguments is an art: it requires, for both parties, precision and rigor in the demonstration, but also oratorical talent and something else, indefinable, that the great jurists who often litigate in The Hague possess.

Some Interesting Details

Since English and French are the only two languages in which States can address ICJ judges, usually a State litigating in The Hague seeks to have two jurists who have a convincing capacity in these two languages.

Practice shows that usually, for a given dispute, at least two representatives of the Anglo-Saxon school of international law and two jurists (not necessarily French) are hired to represent the French school of international law when addressing the judges of the ICJ. Sometimes, a State may settle for a legal team of only two persons who share the language in which the pleadings are to be presented.

Depending on the degree of complexity of a case, States may call upon additional legal professionals to orally present the State’s legal arguments, right after the introductory words of the Agent, who is considered the head of the delegation when both delegations are installed in front of the judges in The Hague in the courtroom of the majestic Peace Palace: the ICJ always addresses the Agent, and it is the Agent who opens and closes the presentation of the arguments by his legal team.

In practice, States do not use jurists of their nationality, with few exceptions, when addressing ICJ judges.

Costa Rica is one of the States that has opted for this option in an attempt to stop Nicaragua’s battery of arguments in its repetition disputes related to the San Juan River. The reading of the ICJ judgment of 2009 (navigation rights), of 2015 (Nicaraguan incursion in Portillos Island and the so-called “border trocha” made by Costa Rica), of 2018 – compensation amount for environmental damage (Note 3) and maritime delimitation in both oceans – denotes that before a battle-hardened legal team such as Nicaragua’s (Note 4), this option did not always achieve its purpose, since they were Costa Rican jurists or diplomats with limited experience in the art of litigation before the ICJ judges and with a convincing capacity not always at the height of the high interests that they defend and that are discussed in The Hague (Note 5).

In the case of navigation rights on the San Juan River (2005-2009), rarely has a State with treaty rights since 1858 to navigate on a river like the San Juan with its police, gone to the ICJ in The Hague and heard 4 years later …. in a sentence, that it is forbidden to exercise any type of police navigation in that same river (see paragraph 156, paragraphs h) and i) of the sentence of July 2009 taken unanimously). On such a repeated, systematic and costly (Note 6) recourse to international justice between two States (a spectacle never observed in The Hague since 1945), we had in 2011 the possibility to warn in the conclusion of an article (Note 7) that:

Después de un prolongado período de una dañina “sanjuanización” de sus relaciones que perduró por más de 10 años (de julio de 1998 al 13 de julio del 2009, fecha del fallo anterior de la CIJ), pareciera que algunos sectores tienen algún interés en azuzar los ánimos, arriesgándose así a abrir otro nuevo período que afecte la compleja agenda bilateral suspendida desde muchos años entre Costa Rica y Nicaragua.

Returning to the hearings held in The Hague between Nicaragua and Germany, it is noteworthy that while Nicaragua appeared at the Hague bar with a delegation composed of 11 persons, Germany considered it useful and opportune to appear with a slightly larger delegation of 16 persons.

The imbalance could have been much greater in the case of other disputes: for example, in June 2007, Nicaragua appeared at The Hague with 8 members, Colombia with 18 members (see pages 4-7 of the verbatim); in November 2022, Guyana appeared at The Hague with 15 members, Venezuela with 32 (see pages 4-9 of the verbatim). Of ungrateful memory for the United States, it should be recalled that when in April 1984, Nicaragua appeared at the Hague bar against the United States, it initially presented itself with a delegation composed of 7 persons, while the United States did so with 18 members (see verbatim, volume 1, p.33 ); when the ICJ declared itself perfectly competent in November 1984, the United States chose not to appear any more (see verbatim p.3 of hearings held in September 1985, with the only Nicaraguan delegation present in The Hague).

Returning again to the hearings held in The Hague between Nicaragua and Germany, for the oral presentation of its arguments, Nicaragua resorted to the services of the Frenchman Alain Pellet, a renowned jurist who began his career as a litigator in The Hague with Nicaragua in 1984, when Nicaragua sued the United States: he is probably the most experienced jurist in the art of international litigation, and who has accompanied numerous States in their legal disputes in The Hague. In the case of Nicaragua, he has been part of the legal team since 1984 in an uninterrupted manner: against the United States in 1984, against Honduras in 1999, against Colombia in 2001, against Costa Rica in 2009 (Nicaragua being sued this time), as well as in 2010, 2011, 2014 and 2017 (always before Costa Rica) and against Colombia again (with two lawsuits filed in 2013 by Nicaragua).

In 2022, another of the great figures of Nicaragua’s legal team since the historic feat initiated against the United States in 1984, presented his resignation to Nicaragua, which we had the occasion to analyze (Note 8).

In addition to the Gallic Alain Pellet, Nicaragua was presented this April 8 with Daniel Müller, a German jurist with minor experience (see link) and who started in the art of litigation in The Hague in 2006 with Alain Pellet in the legal team of Guinea against Democratic Republic of Congo – see verbatim).

Germany for its part appeared at the bar this April 9 with a large team (in order of presentation of their arguments): starting with British jurist Christian J. Tams (first before ICJ judges in 2014 advising Serbia against Croatia – see verbatim), another Briton Samuel Wordsworth (first appearance in The Hague in 2013 as counsel for Costa Rica against Nicaragua in the Isla Portillos case – see verbatim– ), Anne Peters (German jurist, this being her first appearance at the bar in The Hague), and concluding with Paolo Palchetti (Italian jurist, with a first appearance in The Hague in 2011 in Italy’s legal team against Germany – see verbatim).

One will note Germany’s imbalance in the use of English during the presentation of its oral arguments, while the Pellet-Müller duo did manage to strike an almost perfect balance in the use of the two working languages of the ICJ: the April 8 verbatim records 12 opening pages by the Agent of Nicaragua (English), followed by 12 pages by Daniel Müller (English), 13 pages by Alain Pellet (French), and 10 closing pages by the Agent of Nicaragua in English.

Let us note that Nicaragua appointed as Ad Hoc judge the Jordanian jurist Awn Al-Khasawneh (see page 8 of the verbatim of the first day of hearings): he is a jurist with a long experience having been judge of the ICJ between 2000 and 2011; while Germany already has a judge of his nationality among the incumbent judges of the ICJ as of January 1, 2021.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the Nicaraguan diplomat who serves as Nicaragua’s Agent this April 2024 is the same one who has assumed this function since the hearings held in April 1984 in the first case brought against the United States and then in the 14 disputes brought before the ICJ involving Nicaragua (of which 6 with Costa Rica): he is undoubtedly the diplomat in the world with the most experience in the litigation at The Hague.

In Conclusion

Beyond these and other formal details, once the hearings were over, the ICJ began to deliberate on the basis of the arguments presented by both States, to decide whether to order some of the provisional measures urgently requested by Nicaragua, or whether to reject this request as requested by Germany.

Contrary to some German colleagues who, on social networks, have already claimed that the ICJ will reject Nicaragua’s request – we will omit naming them so as not to cause further embarrassment -, we consider it prudent to wait for the ICJ’s decision, which should be read in the coming weeks, given the urgency of the dramatic situation in Gaza.

We recently had the opportunity to point out to two of our European colleagues that their statement about the lack of speed of the ICJ in convening hearings after receiving Nicaragua’s request against Germany was totally erroneous in light of the ICJ’s practice in similar requests (Note 9).

From a procedural point of view, it should be noted that the ICJ’s order between Nicaragua and Germany will constitute a preliminary decision, answering Nicaragua’s urgent request in the affirmative (or negative). And that the decision on the merits of the case will be read within a minimum of 4 years (provided that Germany does not proceed to use procedural incidents, the effect of which is to delay the contentious procedure).

With regard to the understandable enthusiasm of German colleagues upon hearing the German legal team in The Hague on April 9 and the feeling of security they felt upon hearing its members, we are of the opinion (shared for many years with all our students and friends of the Law School of the UCR, as well as international analysts and journalists), that anticipating the content of a future ICJ decision is always a bit adventurous: traditionally, the international judge in The Hague seeks to strike a subtle balance between the claims of one side and the other in all his decisions.

Text shared by Nicolás Boeglin, Professor of International Public Law, School of Law, University of Costa Rica (UCR). Contact: nboeglin@gmail.com


Note 1: See BOEGLIN N., Gaza / Israel: Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ) fija audiencias en demanda de Nicaragua contra Alemania“, note edited March 15, 2024. Text available here.

Note 2: See ATT Expert Group, Domestic accountability for international arms transfers: Law, policy and practice, Saferworld, 2021, 54 pages. Text available by clicking on “donwloadhere. See also in relation to the European Union’s regional regulations on the matter MERLIN J.-B., “Les contentieux nationaux relatifs à la vente interétatique d’armes“, Vol. 65 Annuaire Français de Droit International, Année (2019) pp.71-103. Full text of that article available here.

On Canada and the debate over the illegality of arms sent to the Saudi-led coalition in the civil war in Yemen, see AZAROVA V., DAVID E., TURP D., WOOD B., Opinion on the International Legality of Arms Transfers to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Other Members of the Coalition Militarily Involved in Yemen, IPIS, 102 pages, December 2019. Full text available here. It is of interest to note that, in June 2020, Spain opted to suspend the shipment of 600,000 cartridges to Nicaragua due to the disproportionate repression against demonstrators by Nicaraguan police authorities (see note by Roundtable Table).

Note 3: See BOEGLIN N., “Costa Rica-Nicaragua: notes on the compensation for environmental damage in Isla Portillos set by the ICJ“, note edited on February 2, 2018 and available here.

Note 4: In an article published on February 26, 2006 in La Nación, entitled “La Haya: aspectos procesales“, we would like to point out the great experience of the Nicaraguan team compared to that of Costa Rica, as Nicaragua was able to bring together a team composed of Ian Brownlie (United Kingdom), Alain Pellet (France), Paul Reichler (United States), and Antonio Remiro Brottons (Spain).

Note 5: In a commentary to a procedural joinder (“jonction d’instances” in French) conducted by the ICJ at the request of Nicaragua (and objected to by Costa Rica), published in France (see text) and entitled “Costa Rica / Nicaragua et CIJJ: une procédure incident revisitée: la jonction d’instance“, we had indicated that:

Les autorités du Costa Rica avaient réagi dès le mois de janvier 2013 (par la voix du Vice Ministre des Relations Extérieures) à la demande de jonction du Nicaragua en indiquant son caractère dilatoire (22). A peine connue la décision de la CIJ de joindre les deux instances, elles ont une nouvelle fois réagi, par la voix du Ministre des Relations Extérieures, dénonçant la “tactique dilatoire” du Nicaragua (23). L´analyse que font les autorités du Costa Rica se limite au facteur temps proprement dit : or, plus qu´une à une dilation, c´est à une véritable dilution de l´affaire initiale à laquelle procède la Cour, dont profitera aisément le défendeur original, en l´occurrence le Nicaragua. Par ce tour de passe-passe, le Nicaragua se retrouve, tout comme le Costa Rica, dans une situation de parfaite égalité : les deux Etats sont à la fois demandeur et défendeur. Afin de ne pas blesser les susceptibilités, on se bornera à dire que la manœuvre du Nicaragua s´avère plutôt concluante.

In an article in Spanish, always in relation to this union of procedures, we indicate that:

Dicha ordenanza no cuenta con precedente alguno en la jurisprudencia de la CIJ, ya que, en casos anteriores, la unión de procedimientos se hizo siempre a petición de ambos contrincantes, y no de uno solo.

Véase BOEGLIN N., “Lectura del fallo de la CIJ entre Costa Rica y Nicaragua el próximo 16 de diciembre: breves observaciones“, sitio de la Maestría en Derecho Ambiental, Facultad de Derecho, UCR, 13/12/2015, p. 5. Texto disponible aquí.

Note 6: In the case of Costa Rica (and Nicaragua), the amounts that each State had to pay to finance these repeated disputes in The Hague between 2005 and 2018 remain a real unknown. In Chile, the Executive Branch had to acknowledge in 2015 (and this against its will) having spentUS$20.3 million to face the only lawsuit filed by Peru in January 2008 before the ICJ (see nota press release) and resolved in January 2014 by the judge in The Hague.

For its part, Bolivia acknowledged in 2018 having spent more than US$14 million in the case of its lawsuit – see text – filed in 2013 against Chile (see press release) while Chile acknowledged an amount exceeding 24 million US$ (see press release): this transparency on the part of these Andean region States on the exact cost that a lawsuit in The Hague represents for a State deserves to be saluted, given the opacity and secrecy that many others maintain with respect to this item.

In the case of Chile, it was indicated that 75% of the 24 million US$ corresponded to the payment of legal consultancies and international experts (see note press release). In Costa Rica, in one of the few press releases published (CRHoy, edition of 3/06/2015 – see nota) reads that, “Throughout the first trial, these specialists in boundary matters charged the country $1 for their professional services“: a truly strange fact, which we thought it appropriate to mention, and which … should perhaps be made known urgently to all those who watch over the good health of public finances in Bolivia, Chile and Peru.

Note 7: See BOEGLIN N., “Dragado del río San Juan y balance en la decisión de La Haya del 8 de marzo entre Costa Rica y Nicaragua“, Revista Estudios, Num. 24 (2011), Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR), pp. 362-379. Text available here.

Note 8: See BOEGLIN N., “Nicaragua: on the resignation of one of the main architects of achievements obtained before international justice“, note edited on March 28, 2022 and available here.

Note 9: See our comments at the end in BENDEL J & SUEDI Y., “Recent genocide cases and public interest litigation: a complicated relationship”, EJIL Talk, April 5, 2024 issue.Text available here. .